Reference:
N. Groot,
B. De Schutter, and
H. Hellendoorn,
"Dynamic optimal routing based on a reverse Stackelberg game
approach," Proceedings of the 15th International IEEE Conference
on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC 2012), Anchorage,
Alaska, pp. 782-787, Sept. 2012.
Abstract:
A game-theoretic approach to dynamic routing is proposed in order to
maximize the traffic throughput on a freeway network. While existing
methods of informing drivers of the approximate travel times for the
alternative routes do not in general yield the system optimum, we can
achieve a better performance by introducing a leader-follower game
with monetary incentives. In particular, a control strategy is
proposed in which the traffic authority (the leader) proposes a
function that maps the possible travel times for a certain destination
to positive or negative monetary incentives. Based on this function
that is communicated via on-board computers, the drivers (followers)
will rationally choose those travel times associated with an optimal
distribution over the available routes. Finally, in return for the
associated monetary value, the drivers are presented with a route that
they should follow to the desired destination.