Reference:
N. Groot,
B. De Schutter, and
H. Hellendoorn,
"Reverse Stackelberg games, Part I: Basic framework," Proceedings
of the 2012 IEEE International Conference on Control
Applications, Dubrovnik, Croatia, pp. 421-426, Oct. 2012.
Abstract:
The class of reverse Stackelberg games, also known as incentives,
embodies a structure for sequential decision making that has been
recognized as a suitable approach for hierarchical control problems
like road tolling and electricity pricing. In this game, a leader
player announces a mapping of the follower's decision space into the
leader's decision space, after which a follower player determines his
optimal decision variables. Compared to the original Stackelberg game,
the reverse Stackelberg approach has several advantages that will be
emphasized in this survey. Since the reverse Stackelberg game has been
studied in different research areas, first a comprehensive overview is
provided of the definition of the game. Further, several areas of
application are stated. In the companion paper entitled 'Reverse
Stackelberg Games, Part II: Results and Open Issues', main
contributions are subsequently summarized along with several
characteristics of the game and open issues that are relevant for
further research, are presented.